security

📁 outfitter-dev/agents 📅 Jan 26, 2026
0
总安装量
7
周安装量
安装命令
npx skills add https://github.com/outfitter-dev/agents --skill security

Agent 安装分布

github-copilot 7
gemini-cli 6
opencode 6
codex 6
cursor 6
claude-code 5

Skill 文档

Security Engineering

Threat-aware code review. Vulnerability detection. Risk-ranked remediation.

<when_to_use>

  • Security audits and code reviews
  • Authentication/authorization review
  • Input validation and sanitization checks
  • Cryptographic implementation review
  • Dependency and supply chain security
  • Threat modeling for new features

NOT for: performance optimization, general code review, feature implementation

</when_to_use>

Load the maintain-tasks skill for stage tracking. Each stage feeds the next.

Stage Trigger activeForm
Threat Model Session start “Building threat model”
Attack Surface Model complete “Mapping attack surface”
Vulnerability Scan Surface mapped “Scanning for vulnerabilities”
Risk Assessment Vulns identified “Assessing risk levels”
Remediation Plan Risks assessed “Planning remediation”

Critical findings: add urgent remediation task immediately.

<severity_levels>

CVSS-aligned severity for findings:

Indicator Severity CVSS Examples
Critical 9.0-10.0 RCE, auth bypass, mass data exposure, admin privesc
High 7.0-8.9 SQLi, stored XSS, auth weakness, sensitive data leak
Medium 4.0-6.9 CSRF, reflected XSS, info disclosure, weak crypto
Low 0.1-3.9 Misconfig, missing headers, verbose errors

Format: “Critical RCE via unsanitized shell command”

</severity_levels>

<threat_modeling>

STRIDE Framework

Systematic threat identification by category:

Threat Question Check
Spoofing Can attacker impersonate? Auth mechanisms, tokens, sessions, API keys
Tampering Can attacker modify data? Input validation, integrity checks, DB access
Repudiation Can actions be denied? Audit logs, signatures, timestamps
Info Disclosure Can attacker access secrets? Encryption, access control, logging
Denial of Service Can attacker disrupt? Rate limits, timeouts, input size
Elevation Can attacker gain access? Authz checks, RBAC, least privilege

Attack Trees

Map paths from attacker goal to entry points:

Goal: Steal credentials
- Attack login
  - SQLi in username
  - Brute force (no rate limit)
  - Session fixation
- Intercept traffic
  - HTTPS downgrade
  - MITM
- Exploit reset
  - Predictable token
  - No expiry

For each branch assess: feasibility, impact, detection, current defenses.

Trust Boundaries

Identify where data crosses trust levels:

  • Browser to server
  • Server to database
  • Service to third-party API
  • Internal service to service

Every boundary needs validation.

</threat_modeling>

<attack_surface>

Entry Points

External:

  • HTTP/API endpoints (REST, GraphQL, gRPC)
  • WebSocket connections
  • File uploads
  • OAuth/SAML flows
  • Webhooks

Data Inputs:

  • User data (forms, query params, headers)
  • File content (type, size, payload)
  • API payloads (JSON, XML)
  • Database queries

Auth Boundaries:

  • Public (no auth)
  • Authenticated
  • Admin/privileged
  • Service-to-service

Prioritize Review

  1. Unauthenticated external inputs
  2. Privileged operations
  3. Data persistence layers
  4. Third-party integrations

For each entry point document:

  • Auth required? (none/user/admin)
  • Input validated? (none/basic/strict)
  • Rate limited?
  • Logged?
  • Encrypted?

</attack_surface>

<vulnerability_patterns>

Quick Reference

Vulnerability Vulnerable Secure
SQL Injection String concat in query Parameterized queries
XSS innerHTML with user data textContent or DOMPurify
Command Injection exec() with user input execFile() with array
Path Traversal Direct path concat basename + prefix check
Weak Password MD5/SHA1/plain bcrypt (12+) or argon2
Predictable Token Math.random/Date.now crypto.randomBytes(32)
Broken Auth Client-side role check Server-side every request
IDOR No ownership check Verify user owns resource
Hardcoded Secret API key in code Environment variable
Info Leak Stack trace to user Generic error, log detail

Critical Checks

Authentication:

  • Passwords: bcrypt/argon2, cost 12+
  • Sessions: crypto.randomBytes(32), httpOnly, secure, sameSite
  • JWT: verify signature, specify algorithm, short expiry
  • Reset: random token, 1hr expiry, hash stored token

Authorization:

  • Server-side on every request
  • Verify ownership before resource access
  • Explicit allowlist for mass assignment
  • No role elevation from client input

Input Validation:

  • Type, length, format on all inputs
  • Parameterized queries (never concat)
  • Escape/sanitize HTML output
  • Validate file uploads (type, size, content)

Cryptography:

  • AES-256-GCM, SHA-256+
  • Never MD5, SHA1, DES, ECB
  • Secrets from env, never hardcoded
  • crypto.randomBytes for all tokens

See vulnerability-patterns.md for code examples.

</vulnerability_patterns>

<owasp_top_10>

2021 OWASP Top 10 categories. Check each during vulnerability scan.

# Category Key CWEs Top Mitigations
A01 Broken Access Control 200, 352, 639 Server-side checks, ownership validation
A02 Cryptographic Failures 259, 327, 331 TLS, bcrypt, no hardcoded secrets
A03 Injection 20, 79, 89 Parameterized queries, input validation
A04 Insecure Design 209, 256, 434 Threat modeling, rate limiting
A05 Security Misconfiguration 16, 611, 614 Security headers, disable debug
A06 Vulnerable Components 1035, 1104 npm audit, Dependabot
A07 Auth Failures 287, 307, 521 Strong passwords, MFA, rate limiting
A08 Integrity Failures 502, 494 Verify signatures, schema validation
A09 Logging Failures 117, 532, 778 Audit logs, redact sensitive data
A10 SSRF 918 URL allowlist, block private IPs

See owasp-top-10.md for detailed breakdowns with code examples.

</owasp_top_10>

Loop: Model Threats -> Map Surface -> Scan Vulnerabilities -> Assess Risk -> Plan Remediation

  1. Threat Model

    • STRIDE analysis for component
    • Attack trees for critical paths
    • Identify trust boundaries
    • Document threat actors
  2. Attack Surface

    • Inventory all inputs
    • Classify by auth level
    • Map data flows across boundaries
    • Prioritize high-risk entry points
  3. Vulnerability Scan

    • Check each entry against OWASP Top 10
    • Review auth/authz
    • Validate input handling
    • Check crypto usage
    • Scan deps: npm audit, cargo audit
  4. Risk Assessment

    • Rate severity (Critical/High/Medium/Low)
    • Consider exploitability
    • Assess impact (CIA triad)
    • Calculate risk score
  5. Remediation Plan

    • Critical: immediate action
    • High: fix before release
    • Medium: schedule in sprint
    • Low: backlog or accept

Update todos as you progress. Use review-checklist.md for verification.

Finding Format

## {SEVERITY} {VULN_NAME}

**Category**: {OWASP} | **CWE**: {ID} | **File**: {PATH}:{LINES}

### Issue
{CLEAR_EXPLANATION}

### Impact
{WHAT_ATTACKER_COULD_DO}

### Fix
{SPECIFIC_REMEDIATION_WITH_CODE}

Summary Format

# Security Audit: {SCOPE}

| Severity | Count |
|----------|-------|
| Critical | N |
| High | N |
| Medium | N |
| Low | N |

## Key Findings
1. {TOP_CRITICAL}
2. {SECOND}
3. {THIRD}

## Recommendations
- Immediate: {CRITICAL_FIXES}
- Short-term: {HIGH_MEDIUM}
- Long-term: {HARDENING}

See report-templates.md for full templates.

ALWAYS:

  • Start with threat modeling before code review
  • Map complete attack surface
  • Check against all OWASP Top 10 categories
  • Use severity indicators consistently
  • Provide specific remediation with code
  • Verify fixes don’t introduce new vulnerabilities
  • Document security assumptions
  • Update todos when transitioning stages

NEVER:

  • Skip threat modeling for “simple” features
  • Assume input is trustworthy
  • Rely on client-side security
  • Use deprecated crypto (MD5, SHA1, DES)
  • Log sensitive data
  • Disable security checks “temporarily”
  • Mark complete without remediation plan

Deep dives:

Related skills:

  • codebase-recon – evidence-based investigation foundation
  • debugging – when security issues manifest as bugs

External: