Philosophy of Language Skill

Master the philosophical study of language: How do words mean? How does reference work? What is truth?

Core Questions

Theories of Meaning

Frege: Sense and Reference

FREGEAN SEMANTICS
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REFERENCE (Bedeutung)
├── What expression picks out
├── "Venus" refers to Venus
└── Compositional: Reference of whole from parts

SENSE (Sinn)
├── Mode of presentation
├── Cognitive significance
├── "Morning star" vs. "Evening star"
└── Same reference, different sense

WHY BOTH?
├── "Hesperus = Phosphorus" is informative
├── "Hesperus = Hesperus" is trivial
├── Same reference, different sense
└── Sense determines reference

Russell: Descriptions

The Problem: “The present King of France is bald”

• No King of France exists
• What does the sentence mean?

Russell’s Analysis:

"The F is G" =
∃x(Fx ∧ ∀y(Fy → y=x) ∧ Gx)

"There is exactly one F, and it is G"

Not a referring expression but a quantified claim
False (not meaningless) because no unique F exists

Direct Reference

Kripke’s Revolution:

• Names are rigid designators
• Refer to same thing in all possible worlds
• Not abbreviated descriptions

KRIPKE'S ARGUMENTS
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MODAL ARGUMENT:
"Aristotle might not have been a philosopher"
├── Makes sense
├── But "The teacher of Alexander might not have taught Alexander"
│   └── Would make Aristotle not Aristotle
└── Names ≠ descriptions

EPISTEMIC ARGUMENT:
We can discover "Hesperus = Phosphorus"
├── A posteriori necessary truth
├── Same thing in all worlds
└── But discovered, not known a priori

SEMANTIC ARGUMENT:
Reference is causal-historical
├── Not by fitting description
├── Baptism + chain of communication
└── Name-using practice

Meaning and Use

Wittgenstein: Meaning as Use

Early: Meaning is picturing reality Later: “Meaning is use in a language game”

Language Games:

• Meaning depends on context, rules, practice
• No single essence to “meaning”
• Family resemblance

Private Language Argument:

• No purely private meanings
• Rule-following requires community
• Meaning is public

Speech Act Theory (Austin, Searle)

SPEECH ACT THEORY
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THREE TYPES OF ACTS:

LOCUTIONARY
├── Saying something with meaning
└── Uttering words with sense and reference

ILLOCUTIONARY
├── What you do in saying it
├── Promising, warning, asserting
└── Force of the utterance

PERLOCUTIONARY
├── Effect on hearer
├── Persuading, frightening, amusing
└── Consequences of saying

FELICITY CONDITIONS:
├── Preparatory: Appropriate circumstances
├── Sincerity: Speaker means it
├── Essential: Counts as the act
└── Infelicity: Act fails (not false, but unhappy)

Reference and Names

Descriptivist Theory

Frege/Russell: Names = disguised descriptions

• “Aristotle” = “The teacher of Alexander” (or cluster)
• Reference determined by satisfying description

Problems (Kripke):

• Modal: Could have failed to satisfy description
• Epistemic: Can discover identity
• Semantic: Reference even with false beliefs

Causal-Historical Theory

Kripke/Putnam:

• Initial baptism fixes reference
• Reference transmitted through causal chain
• Community-based reference

Natural Kind Terms

Putnam’s Twin Earth:

TWIN EARTH
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Scenario:
├── Twin Earth exactly like Earth
├── Except "water" is XYZ, not H₂O
├── XYZ phenomenally identical to H₂O
└── 1750: No one knows difference

Question: Does "water" mean the same?

Putnam: No!
├── "Water" on Earth refers to H₂O
├── "Water" on Twin Earth refers to XYZ
├── "Meanings ain't in the head"
└── Natural kind terms refer to natural kinds

Truth

Correspondence Theory

• Truth = correspondence to facts
• “Snow is white” is true iff snow is white
• Problems: What are facts? What is correspondence?

Coherence Theory

• Truth = coherence with other beliefs
• System of beliefs that hangs together
• Problems: Coherent fictions?

Pragmatic Theory

• Truth = what works
• Useful beliefs are true
• Problems: Useful ≠ true

Deflationism

• “True” is just a device for endorsement
• “Snow is white” is true = Snow is white
• No substantial property

Tarski’s Semantic Theory

TARSKIAN TRUTH
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T-SCHEMA:
"S" is true iff S

EXAMPLE:
"Snow is white" is true iff snow is white

Requirements:
├── Object language (mentioned)
├── Metalanguage (used)
├── Hierarchy avoids liar paradox
└── Truth defined for formal languages

Context and Indexicals

Indexicals

• “I”, “here”, “now”, “this”
• Reference depends on context of utterance
• Kaplan: Character vs. Content

KAPLAN'S THEORY
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CHARACTER
├── Rule for determining reference
├── "I" = speaker of context
└── Constant across contexts

CONTENT
├── What's said in context
├── "I am tired" said by me
└── Proposition about me

Contextualism

• Meaning of many expressions context-dependent
• Not just indexicals
• “Knows”, “tall”, “ready”

Key Vocabulary

Integration with Repository

Related Skills

• analytic-philosophy: Core tradition
• logic: Formal semantics

Related Themes

• thoughts/knowledge/: Language and thought