defi-security
0
总安装量
3
周安装量
安装命令
npx skills add https://github.com/0xlayerghost/solidity-agent-kit --skill defi-security
Agent 安装分布
claude-code
3
windsurf
1
trae
1
cursor
1
codex
1
Skill 文档
DeFi Security Principles
Language Rule
- Always respond in the same language the user is using. If the user asks in Chinese, respond in Chinese. If in English, respond in English.
Scope: Only applicable to DeFi projects (DEX, lending, staking, LP, yield). Non-DeFi projects can ignore this skill.
Protection Decision Rules
| Threat | Required Protection |
|---|---|
| Whale manipulation | Daily transaction caps + per-tx amount limits + cooldown window |
| MEV / sandwich attack | EOA-only checks (msg.sender == tx.origin), or use commit-reveal pattern |
| Arbitrage | Referral binding + liquidity distribution + fixed yield model + lock period |
| Reentrancy | ReentrancyGuard on all external-call functions (see solidity-security skill) |
| Flash loan attack | Check block.number change between operations, or use TWAP pricing |
| Price manipulation | Chainlink oracle or TWAP â never rely on spot AMM reserves for pricing |
| Approval exploit | Use safeIncreaseAllowance / safeDecreaseAllowance, never raw approve for user flows |
Anti-Whale Implementation Rules
- Maximum single transaction amount: configurable via
onlyOwnersetter - Daily cumulative limit per address: track with
mapping(address => mapping(uint256 => uint256))(address â day â amount) - Cooldown between transactions: enforce minimum time gap with
block.timestampcheck - Whitelist for exempt addresses (deployer, LP pair, staking contract)
Flash Loan Protection Rules
- For price-sensitive operations: require that
block.numberhas changed since last interaction - For oracle-dependent calculations: use time-weighted average (TWAP) over minimum 30 minutes
- For critical state changes: add minimum holding period before action (e.g., must hold tokens for N blocks)
Launch Checklist
Before mainnet deployment, verify all items:
- All
onlyOwnerfunctions transferred to multisig (e.g., Gnosis Safe) - Timelock contract deployed and configured (minimum 24h delay for critical changes)
-
Pausableemergency switch tested â bothpause()andunpause()work correctly - Daily limit parameters documented and set to reasonable values
- Third-party security audit completed and all critical/high findings resolved
- Testnet deployment running for minimum 7 days with no issues
- Slippage, fee, and lock period parameters reviewed and documented
- Initial liquidity plan documented (amount, lock duration, LP token handling)
-
forge test --fuzz-runs 10000passes on all DeFi-critical functions
Emergency Response Procedure
| Step | Action |
|---|---|
| 1. Detect | Monitor alerts trigger (on-chain monitoring, community reports) |
| 2. Pause | Designated address calls pause() â must respond within minutes |
| 3. Assess | Technical lead analyzes root cause, estimates fund impact |
| 4. Communicate | Post incident notice to community channels (Discord, Twitter, Telegram) |
| 5. Fix | Deploy fix or prepare recovery plan |
| 6. Resume | Call unpause() after fix verified on fork â or migrate to new contract |
| 7. Post-mortem | Publish detailed incident report within 48 hours |
DeFi Testing Commands
# Fuzz test fund flows with high iterations
forge test --match-contract StakingTest --fuzz-runs 10000
# Fork mainnet to test against real state
forge test --fork-url $MAINNET_RPC -vvvv
# Simulate whale transaction on fork
cast send <CONTRACT> "stake(uint256)" 1000000000000000000000000 \
--rpc-url $FORK_RPC --private-key $TEST_KEY